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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

there was substantial performance entitling the contractor
to recovery upon the contract; or if they found his performance not substantial whether the contractor could recover
for part performance under quantum meruit. In the latter
instance the jury would have to find that the contractor's
performance was either accepted by the Luggage Company
or rendered impossible by act of God or law. The verdict
returned by the jury failed to disclose upon what grounds
plaintiff was allowed to recover, thereby giving rise to
speculation concerning the measure of damages. If the contractor has not performed according to the contract, his
remedy is restricted to quantum meruit with damages based
upon reasonable value and not contract price. Such a distinction can have a substantial effect upon amount of recovery and, therefore, should be made in each case in order
that the recovery allowed is in accord with the remedy
afforded.
HERBERT

A.

SEMAN

Recent Decisions
Accession - Replacement Motor Becomes Part Of Autobile. Allied Investment Company v. Shaneyfelt, 74 N. W. 2d
723 (Neb. 1956). An action in replevin was brought by the
assignee of a conditional sales contract, duly recorded, to
recover a car held by defendant to secure his improvement
lien for a new motor put in the car at the request of the conditional vendee but without the knowledge or consent of
the vendor, the vendee having defaulted on both car and
motor. On plaintiff's appeal from a judgment granting him
replevin less the value of the motor, held, reversed. The
motor, being a vital, integral part of the car, became the
property of the conditional vendor upon installation by the
doctrine of accession, free of any liens the priority of which
he did not approve.
While the Court of Appeals of Maryland has not had
occasion to pass upon the law of accession to personalty,
there are several cases on improvements to real property.
Typical of the Court's view on this subject is Warwick v.
Harvey, 158 Md. 457, 148 A. 592 (1930). One who makes
improvements on land, even though he has constructive
notice of his lack of title, is not deprived of the benefit of
compensation for said improvements.
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Franklin Service Stations v. Sterling Motor Truck Co.
of N. E., 50 R. I. 336, 147 A. 754 (1929), and Tire Shop v.
Peat, 115 Conn. 187, 161 A. 96 (1932), allowed conditional
sellers of tires and tubes recovery of new tires put on cars
repossessed by the conditional vendors of said cars. Clark
v. Wells, 45 Vt. 4, held that wheels and axles did not become
identified with the car until the conditional vendor of these
parts was paid in full. In Hallman v. Dothan Foundry &
Machine Co., 17 Ala. App. 152, 82 S. 642 (1919), the mortgagee of a truck body was granted recovery of this body,
which had been attached to the chassis of a car. The opposite result was reached in Bozeman Mortuary Association v.
Fairchild,253 Ky. 74, 68 S. W. 2d 756 (1934), where a new
battery, muffler and tires put on a stolen car by a bona fide
purchaser became by accession the property of the owner of
the stolen car. In Atlas Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 121 Conn. 188, 183
A. 690 (1936), a bona fide purchaser installed a new engine
in a stolen car. The rightful owner recovered the car but
not the engine, which was held to be readily detachable
without doing damage to the rest of the car. But compare
National Retailers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gambino, 1 N. J. Super.
627, 64 A. 2d 927 (1948), where a thief, after putting a
motor to which he had title into a car he had stolen, sold
the vehicle to bona fide defendant. The Court approved of
the Gibbs case, supra, but distinguished it and allowed
plaintiff absolute recovery. Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile
Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 90 A. 2d 485 (Del. Super. 1952), held
that seat covers and a gasoline tank did not become an integral part of the automobile.
Bankruptcy - Preferences - Claim Of Insolvent Estate
Is Not Subordinated To Claim Of Holder Of Insolvent Corporation's Note Indorsed By Deceased. Leo v. L & M Realty
Corporation,228 F. 2d 89 (4th Cir., 1955). L and M owned
all the stock in defendant corporation and were entirely
responsible for its conduct of business. The corporation
needed money, so L and M each made bona fide loans of
approximately $17,000, and the corporation executed two
notes, one to A bank for $5,000 and one to B bank for $9,000,
each note being endorsed by both L and M. L died, leaving
an insolvent estate. M took the last $14,000 of corporate
assets and paid the two notes. Within four months the
estate filed a petition for involuntary bankruptcy of the
corporation, alleging preferential payment of the notes.
There were no creditors of the corporation other than M,
L's estate, and the two banks. On appeal from a dismissal
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of the petition, held, reversed. The debts to M, to L's estate,
and to the banks, being unsecured, all creditors belonged
to the same class and payment of the banks' claims was a
preference under 11 U. S. C. A., Sec. 96 (a) ( 1) (Supp. 1955).
The bona fide independent claim of an indorser of a bankrupt's note is not subordinated to the payment of that note
in the distribution of the bankrupt's assets. The preference
would have prejudiced no other creditors were it not for the
insolvency of L's estate; the corporation cannot benefit M,
by relieving him of his indorsement liability, at the expense
of the creditors of L's estate. "This is just the sort of thing
that the Bankruptcy Act was intended to prevent" (92).
Soper, J., dissented (92): The equitable principle that a
surety may not share equally in a bankruptcy distribution
with creditors he has undertaken to secure should not be
excluded from this case merely because the competing
claims are independent. L, insolvent, had no greater claim
against the corporation than L, solvent, and his creditors,
regardless of their unsatisfactory position, have no greater
claim than L himself. 11 U. S. C. A., Sec. 96(a) (1) (Supp.
1955), is designed to protect the insolvent's creditors, but
not the creditors of the creditors.
Constitutional Law -

Taking Under Eminent Domain

Requires Public Use. Edens v. City of Columbia, 91 S. E.
2d 280 (S. C. 1956). Proceeding under the Redevelopment
Law, defendant city's Housing Authority proposed to condemn a "blighted area" occupied by slum dwellings, clear
it, and sell it to private interests, with appropriate restrictions, for light industrial use. Plaintiff landowners brought
an action for declaratory judgment, alleging unconstitutionality of such condemnation proceedings. On appeal
from a judgment for defendant, held, reversed. Under the
South Carolina Constitution, private property cannot be
taken by eminent domain except for public use. "Public
use" must be narrowly defined to prevent spoliation of
private property under the guise of eminent domain.
"Public use" and "public benefit" are not synonymous.
While acquisition of slum areas for conversion into (1) low
cost housing units and (2) light industrial sites may both
be for "public benefit", only the former is a "public use".
This Court does not adopt the view expressed in Berman v.
Parker,348 U. S. 26 (1954) - that, there being a Legislative right, under the police power, to acquire land for the
public welfare, the use of eminent domain is but a means
to that end.
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Sustaining the validity of a proceeding under Baltimore's Redevelopment Law (Md. Constitution, Art. XIB),
it was said, in Herzinger v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 203 Md. 49, 61, 98 A. 2d 87 (1953), ". . . acquisition
of areas found to be detrimental to the public welfare is a
proper public purpose... our Constitution was amended to
approve the incorporation of this feature into the basic
law". Placing in private hands after acquisition "does not
destroy the public character of the taking insofar as that taking may accomplish a proper public benefit" (60). But the
case, and its treatment of the matter, referred to taking for
the purpose of erecting better housing facilities. Whether
the same criteria would apply to an industrial purpose, as
they would under the Berman rationale, must depend upon
a resolution between the words of Art. XIB(1) (a) (that
the taking may include, but is not limited to "the comprehensive renovation or rehabilitation" of the area) and the
fact that the Legislature, in a seemingly exclusionary move,
expressly provided for takings under the quasi-industrial
purposes of providing parking facilities and harbor improvement (Constitution, Arts. XIC, XID).
Federal Tort Claims Act - Government Liability Extends To Injuries Arising From Negligence Of Coast Guard
In Operation of Lighthouse. Indian Towing Company v.
United States, 76 S. Ct. 122 (1955). Petitioner's tug, while
towing a barge laden with triple super phosphate, went
aground on Chandeleur Island, thereby damaging said
phosphate in excess of $60,000. Seeking recovery under the
Tort Claims Act, petitioner alleged that the Coast Guard,
responsible for operating the lighthouse on said island,
negligently allowed the light to go out, and that the loss
sustained was the proximate result of the Coast Guard's
negligence. The United States District Court granted the
Government's motion to dismiss, on the ground that it had
not consented to such suit under the Act, which decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 211 F. 2d 886 (5th
Cir., 1954). On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed, 349
U. S. 902 (1955). On petition for rehearing granted, held,
(5-4), reversed. 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 2674 (1950 ed.), states:
"The United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner . . . as a private individual under like circumstances
(italics supplied) . . ." This means that if a private person performed the same function - in this instance, operation of lighthouses - and it would be liable for injuries
resulting from negligent performance, then the Govern-
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ment is equally liable; "it is hornbook tort law that one
who undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reliance must perform his 'good samaritan' task
in a careful manner". Mr. Justice Reed dissented: prior
decisions of this Court have determined that the Government is not amenable for negligence arising from any activity "uniquely governmental". "Lighthouse keeping is as
uniquely a governmental function as fire fighting."
Previous interpretations of this clause seem to indicate
no liability if the function in question cannot be privately
controlled. In Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135, 141
(1950), the Court refused recovery to a serviceman sustaining injuries due to the negligent performance of an operation by an Army doctor. The Court reasoned that the
Government is not amenable to prosecution in this instance
because there is no analogous liability of a private individual, for no private individual has the power to conscript
or mobilize an army. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S.
15, 43 (1953), denied governmental liability due to the Coast
Guard's negligent performance of fire fighting duties, on the
basis that public bodies are immune to suit for injuries
resulting from fighting fire, which is a purely governmental
function.
Intoxicating Liquors-Defendant Acting Only As Agent
Of The Prosecutor Is Not Guilty Of Making An Illegal
Sale. Townsel v. State, 286 S. W. 2d 162 (Tex. Crim. App.
1956). In a dry area the prosecutor requested the defendant
to sell him whiskey, whereupon the defendant went and
purchased whiskey from a third party and sold it to the
prosecutor at no advance in price. The defendant was convicted of an unlawful sale and appealed. Held, reversed.
Since the defendant had no interest in behalf of the seller,
but acted only as agent of the prosecutor, delivering to him
at cost, there was no illegal sale.
See entrapment with respect to liquor sales, generally,
18 A. L. R. 162; 66 A. L. R. 488; 86 A. L. R. 267. The reasoning of the case is quite applicable to the numerous illegal
sale provisions under Md. Code (1951 and 1955 Supp.),
Art. 2B.
Motor Vehicles - Contributory Negligence Of Minor
Son Imputed To Father Accompanying Son On Joint Venture. Nelson v. Fulkerson,286 S. W. 2d 129 (Tex. 1956). The
plaintiff brought action for personal injuries allegedly sustained when the automobile in which he was a passenger
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and which was driven by his minor son collided with defendant. The jury found both drivers negligent. On appeal
from judgment for the defendant, held, affirmed. The negligence of one engaged in a joint venture is imputed to the
other. A joint venture exists not only where there is a
common enterprise, but also where there is an equal right,
express or implied, of each to control the conveyance in
question. In that the minor son lived at home and worked
with his father to earn a living for themselves and the
others in the family, the father had the right to control his
son in the operation of the automobile when the son was
driving it, in his father's presence and with his consent,
for purposes of farm work to support their family. This
relationship having been established by direct testimony,
the son's contributory negligence is thereby imputed to the
plaintiff as a matter of law, thus barring recovery.
The Maryland case closest to this point is that of Tobin
v. Hoffman, 202 Md. 382, 389, 96 A. 2d 597 (1953). Therein,
the decisive factor in the finding of a joint venture is declared to be the question of whether or not the passenger
has a right to impose his views on the driver with respect
to the operation of the vehicle; and whether, enjoying such
a power, the passenger failed to exercise it, or did, but
negligently so.
On the imputation of negligence, see 62 A. L. R. 440; 85
A. L. R. 630. On what constitutes joint venture, see 48
A. L. R. 1055, 1077; 63 A. L. R. 909, 921; 80 A. L. R. 312;
95 A. L. R. 857.
Motor Vehicles - Driver Lawfully Upon The Highway
May Assume That Others Will Not Break The Law. Young
v. Truitt, 91 S. E. 2d 115 (Ga. App. 1955). As an automobile,
operated by defendant and in which plaintiff was riding as
invitee, approached the crest of a hill on a single lane highway, defendant saw, in her rear-view mirror, a truck,
approximately 100 yards distant, moving up from behind at
65 miles per hour. Making no signal and no effort to pull
to the right side of the road, defendant slowed from 35 to
30 miles per hour. The truck, trying to pass, struck and
overturned defendant's car, injuring plaintiff, who brought
this action alleging defendant's negligence for slowing suddenly without signal and for failing to steer to the side of
the road to avoid imminent peril. On appeal from a judgment sustaining defendant's demurrer, held, affirmed.
Under the circumstances, defendant's slowing down was
not negligence; even if the truck would have been able to
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pass but for the slowing down, the negligence of the truck
driver in operating his vehicle at an excessive rate of speed
too close to defendant's car was "the sole proximate cause
of the collision". Rather than having a duty to pull to the
side to avoid the truck, defendant had a right to presume
that the truck driver would obey the law and not attempt
to pass on a hill and that he would reduce his speed to
avoid collision.
While the Court of Appeals has apparently never determined what, if any, standard of care a motorist must exercise to save a guest passenger harmless from the negligence
of other motorists, it has had many opportunities to decide
whether it is negligence for a motorist to assume others will
obey the law. However, the facts and the law of those cases
are distinguishable from those of the present case, in that
those cases have involved the interpretation of statutes
governing the rights of motorists at different types of intersections. For a general survey, see Note, "Boulevard Stop"
Streets in Maryland, 4 Md. L. Rev. 207 (1940); Due and
Bishop, Automobile Right of Way in Maryland, 11 Md. L.
Rev. 159 (1950); Note, Driver Having Green Light - Duty
of Care, 13 Md. L. Rev. 350 (1953).
On the broad question of the duty required of a nonnegligent motorist confronted with the "moving" negligence of another who is violating the traffic laws, it would
at least seem from the Maryland cases that favored motorists at intersections are bound to avoid collision with moving violators only under a very strict doctrine of last clear
chance, i.e., where the favored motorist admits having
actually seen the violator in time to have avoided him,
under circumstances which would lead a reasonable man
to say that the favored motorist, with the knowledge he had,
proceeded in such a way as to "invite" the collision. Such a
rule is a necessary inference from the Court's granting a
favored motorist the right to assume the lawful conduct of
others by relieving such motorist of the duty to exercise
reasonable care in discovering motorists whose illegal conduct threatens imminent collision.
In Monumental Motor Tours, Inc. v. Becker, 165 Md. 32,
166 A. 434 (1933), there was no evidence that the favored
driver could have avoided the collision. In Warner v.
Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 358, 189 A. 260 (1937), it was said
that "a driver exercising care for his passengers must recognize, as a fact of common knowledge ... that at crossings
to be dealt with by drivers themselves under the law, those
from the left will often cross negligently, taking chances

19561

RECENT DECISIONS

on avoiding collision, or negligently miscalculating the
chances". But this warning has never expanded with holdings. In Askin v. Long, 176 Md. 545, 551, 6 A. 2d 246 (1939),
it was stated that, if the defendant favored driver could
have seen the unfavored plaintiff by looking, but either
didn't look or didn't see, he was negligent; but the defendant secured a reversal for contributory negligence. In
Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 132, 134, 8 A. 2d 888 (1939),
the favored driver's primary negligence was permitted to
go to the jury on the question whether he did or could have
seen the defendant's car in time to avoid the collision, but
the judgment entered on a verdict for defendant was reversed on grounds that the plaintiff, as favored driver, had
no duty to look for violators. Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md.
218, 235, 46 A. 2d 349 (1946), and Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt,
187 Md. 174, 180, 49 A. 2d 537 (1946), suggested that, in
absence of last clear chance evidence, the favored driver's
negligence, if he is acting lawfully, cannot be questioned.
In the former, favored driver saw the violator at some distance; in the latter, not at all. In Sonnenburg v. Monumental Motor Tours, Inc., 198 Md. 227, 81 A. 2d 617 (1951),
there was ample evidence that the favored driver should
have seen the violator, but he was found non-negligent.
Only in Wlodkowski v. Yerkaitis, 190 Md. 128, 133, 57
A. 2d 792 (1948), where the favored driver actually admitted seeing the violator, doubting that he would stop,
and trying to beat him through the intersection was the
negligence of a favored driver definitely established for
failure to respond reasonably to a collision situation:
"Although a driver privileged under the statute is entitled
to assume that he will be accorded the right of way ... he
cannot continue to rely upon such assumption after he discovers (italics added) that the unprivileged driver does not
intend to yield the right of way." Also closely connected to
this series of cases is Pegelow v. Johnson, 177 Md. 345, 9 A.
2d 645 (1939).
Pleading And Practice - Plaintiff Required To Submit
To Physical Examination May Have Either Attorney Or
Personal Doctor, Or Both, Present. Francisco v. Hoffman,
131 N. E. 2d 692 (Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Franklin
County, 1955). In a personal injury action, defendant moved
to require plaintiff to submit to a preliminary medical examination without the presence of plaintiff's attorney. Held,
although plaintiff must submit to the physical examination,
she may have present during the examination either her
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attorney or personal doctor. Further, counsel for plaintiff,
if either he or the personal physician is not present, may
examine the report under the numerous limitations set
forth in 17 Am. Jur. 52, Discovery and Inspection, Sec. 71.
Upon proper application by the defendant, the court, at
its discretion, may order the plaintiff to submit to a physical
examination. United Rys. & Elec. Co. v. Cloman, 107 Md.
681, 69 A. 379 (1908); Scheffler v. Lee, 126 Md. 373, 94 A.
907 (1915). In Brown v. Hutzler Bros. Co., 152 Md. 39, 136
A. 30 (1927), the plaintiff was allowed to bring her family
physician along, as well as her husband. The issues surrounding the physical examination would, on the basis of
the above, seem completely within the discretion of the
court, although the question as to whether the defendant
may exclude the plaintiff's attorney or physician remains
to be decided. See Discovery Rule 5, General Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Court of Appeals of Maryland
(October 1, 1955), recognizing the court's discretion and
control. On the specific point see 135 A. L. R. 883, et seq.
Testamentary Law - Illegitimate Half-Sister Cannot
Take Intestate Share Of Legitimate Half-Brother's Estate.
In re Klingaman's Estate, 119 A. 2d 748 (Del. Ch. 1956).
Unmarried intestate, predeceased by his parents, was survived by no brothers or sisters other than defendant illegitimate half-sister on his mother's side. Plaintiff cousin petitioned the court for a distribution to collaterals of equal
degree, barring defendant, who was administratrix, from
any share in the estate. Held, petition granted. Though the
Code permits a legitimate child of the same womb to inherit from his illegitimate brother or sister, through the
common mother, the statutory framework controlling the
intestate interests of illegitimates is too rigid to permit the
converse. That framework denies participation of the
closest blood relative of the intestate in his estate.
Md. Code (1951) Art. 93, Sec. 145, is not as narrow as
the several provisions in the Delaware Code, but there is a
close question whether its wording is broad enough to support a holding that an illegitimate child is so placed in the
mother's "blood stream" as to enable him to inherit from
his legitimate brother or sister.
Testamentary Law - Successively Adopted Child
Cannot Inherit From His Prior Adopting Parents. In Re
Leichtenberg's Estate, 7 Ill. 2d 545, 131 N. E. 2d 487 (1956).
Victor left his natural parents and was adopted by the
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Leichtenbergs. Two weeks later he returned to his natural
parents and was subsequently readopted by them. When
Mrs. Leichtenberg died, intestate, Victor filed objections to
the Probate Court's finding that she left no natural or
adopted children. On appeal from a holding sustaining the
objections, held, reversed. "Adopting parents do not, in
every respect, stand in the same relationship to the child
as do his natural parents."
Thus, while the prior adopting parents of a successively
adopted child do not have a duty of support, the natural
parents continue to have that duty regardless of adoption.
One may be the adopted child of adopting parents and the
natural child of natural parents, but he cannot be the
adopted child of successive adopted parents. The probate
laws permit an adopted child to inherit from his adopting
parents as if he were their natural child. It cannot be
assumed that the Legislature intended this to extend to
former adopting parents, for so to hold would be to make
the tracing of heirship too difficult.
Davis, J., dissented: the right to inheritance, either
from natural or adopting parents, is a privilege granted by
statute. Under those statutes, an adopted child is given
the same right of inheritance as a natural child of the same
parents. This leaves no room for interpretation. As a
matter of law Victor is entitled to inherit from the Leichtenbergs as if he were their natural child, which is to say,
regardless of subsequent adoption.
The holding of this case represents the minority American view, the dissent the majority. The Court of Appeals
has not decided the point, but the Maryland statutes are
similar to those of Illinois. The right of a person to inherit
property is not a "natural right" but a privilege "granted
by the state". Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore v.
Bouse, 181 Md. 351, 29 A. 2d 906 (1943). With reference to
interlocutory and final decrees, that "the person adopted
shall be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the petitioner . . . the person adopted shall be entitled to all the
rights and privileges... of a child born in lawful wedlock."
Md. Code (1951) Art. 16, Sec. 86(a). "Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to prevent the person adopted from
inheriting from his natural parents . . ." Md. Code (1951)
Art. 16, Sec. 86(b). See also Md. Code (1951) Art. 16,
Sec. 88.
Majority View Cases: Holmes v. Curl, 189 Ia. 246,
178 N. W. 406 (1920); Dreyer v. Schrick, 105 Kan. 495, 185
P. 30 (1919); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 218 Ark. 423, 236 S. W.
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2d 733 (1951); In Re Egley's Estate, 16 Wash. 2d 681, 134
P. 2d 943, 145 A. L. R. 821 (1943); Villier v. Watson, 168 Ky.
631, 182 S. W. 869 (1916) ; In Re Myre's Estate, 205 Misc. 880,
129 N. Y. S. 2d 531 (1954); Pattersonv. Browning, 146 Ind.
160, 44 N. E. 993 (1896); In Re Sutton's Estate, 161 Minn.
426, 201 N. W. 925 (1925); Coonradt v. Sailors, 186 Tenn.
294, 209 S. W. 2d 859 (1948).
Minority View Cases: In Re Klapp's Estate, 197 Mich.
615, 164 N. W. 381 (1917); In Re Carpenter's Estate, 327
Mich. 195, 41 N. W. 2d 349 (1950); In Re Talley's Estate, 188
Okla. 338, 109 P. 2d 495 (1941).
Torts - One Who Places Himself In The Public Eye
Renounces His Right Of Privacy. Smith v. NationalBroadcasting Co., 292 P. 2d 600 (Cal. App. 1956). Plaintiff made a
false report to the police of the escape of a black panther
from his truck. This report caused widespread fear among
residents of Los Angeles and resulted in a vigorous police
search. The police concluded that there was no truth to the
report. The plaintiff was arrested and given a psychiatric
examination. Three months later defendants produced a
radio broadcast, based on this incident, on the program
"Dragnet". Plaintiff sued for an invasion of his right of
privacy. On appeal from judgment for defendant, held,
affirmed. The interest protected by the right of privacy is
the right to be free from unwarranted publicity of the
private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern. Plaintiff's act
of issuing the fake report, which caused the great search
and greater public turmoil, removed the plaintiff from the
mass of people entitled "to be let alone". His affairs in the
matter were no longer private by the time the broadcast
was made.
While it does not appear that the Maryland Court of
Appeals has recognized a legally enforceable right of
privacy, many other states have done so, either through
statutes or by expanding the common law. For annotations
to this ever-increasing problem see 168 A. L. R. 446; 14
A. L. R. 2d 750.

